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I. INTRODUCTION
Breath testing results stand at the core of most driving under the
influence (DUI) prosecutions.1 Florida law provides that an individual is
guilty of driving under the influence when he drives, or is in actual
physical control of a vehicle, while under the influence of alcohol or a
controlled substance, such that his normal faculties are impaired.2 To
obtain a conviction, the state must prove the element of impairment
beyond a reasonable doubt.3 A breath alcohol level of 0.08 grams of
alcohol per 210 liters of breath satisfies the element of impairment.4 It
comes as no surprise, then, that many DUI cases hinge on these results.

* J.D. expected May 2009, University of Florida Levin College of Law. This Note is
dedicated to my fellow Shorts (Paula, Ed, and Alex) and Kali Feinman. Without their endless
support and love, none of this would have been possible.
1. See, e.g., Paul Schop, Comment, Is DWI DOA?: Admissibility of Breath Testing Evidence
in the Wake of Recent Challenges to Breath-Testing Devices, 20 SW. U. L. REV. 247, 251 (1991)
(“The major tools used to enforce the legislation aimed at reducing the occurrence of DWI’s are
various breath alcohol testing devices.”); see also Todd Ruger, Ready to Open Up On Breath Test:
Firm’s Refusal to Disclose Software ‘Source Code’ has Stalled DUI Cases, SARASOTA HERALD
TRIB., Oct. 6, 2007, at B1 (“A blood-alcohol content reading is the most powerful piece of evidence
against a drunken driver . . . .”).
2. FLA. STAT. § 316.193 (2008).
3. FLA. BAR, FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES, CH. 28.1 (4th ed.
2002).
4. FLA. STAT. § 316.1934(2)(c). If a defendant’s blood alcohol level is tested, the ratio is
0.08 grams per 100 milliliters of blood. FLA. STAT. § 316.193(1)(b).
177

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 5

178

FLO RID A LAW REVIEW

[V ol. 61

Breath testing machines,5 however, often malfunction, leading to
incorrectly high blood alcohol readings, sample volume irregularities, and
unexplained readings.6 False positives can result from diabetes, exposure
to paint thinners, and even being on the Atkins Diet.7 Glitches have
afflicted the Intoxilyzer 50008 and the Intoxilyzer 8000,9 the two breath
testing machines currently used in Florida.10 Given the centrality of breath
test results to many DUI prosecutions, these malfunctions provide concern.
Further concern arises from the fact that the reliability and accuracy of
these machines cannot be independently verified. Florida courts and the
Florida Legislature have foreclosed all attempts by defense counsel to
obtain discovery of technical information about the breath testing
machines.11 As a result of their highly deferential treatment from the state,
the Intoxilyzer models have become “mystical machine[s].”12 The
manufacturer has assured the State of Florida that the Intoxilyzers work,
and law enforcement has determined, to its satisfaction, that the machines
produce accurate results.13 However, defense counsel is unable to
independently verify any of these propositions. Thus, the outcome is truly
circular: the machine is reliable because it produces results; the results are
right because the machine is reliable.

5. In this Note, I refer to what are commonly termed “breathalyzers” as breath testing
machines. The Breathalyzer® is a specific machine produced by National Draeger. Draeger, About
Us, http://www.draeger.com/ST/internet/US/en/Aboutus/History/history2/history2.jsp (last visited
Nov. 11, 2008).
6. Ken Strutin, An Examination of Source Code Evidence, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 13, 2007, at 5.
7. State v. Bastos, 985 So. 2d 37, 41–42 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).
8. See, e.g., Stefan Rose & Kenneth G. Furton, Variables Affecting the Accuracy and
Precision of Breath Alcohol Instruments Including the Intozilyzer[sic] 5000, http://www.hudsonlaw.net/Variable_Affecting_Accuracy_Precision_of_Breath_Alcohol_Instruments_Including_In
toxilyzer_5000.pdf (noting variances of ± 27% and false-positives up to 23% in error).
9. See, e.g., Todd Ruger, Breath Testing Under Scrutiny: Attorneys Plan Legal Attack on
State DUI Machines over Glitch, SARASOTA HERALD TRIB., Oct. 22, 2006, at B1 (noting that the
Intoxilyzer 8000’s first software glitch came to light in September 2006, just about six months after
the introduction of the machine). The glitch resulted in the dismissal of 224 DUI cases throughout
Florida. Palm Beach County Refuse to Overturn, AP ALERT-FLORIDA, June 14, 2007.
10. See Palm Beach County Refuse to Overturn, supra note 9; Ruger, supra note 9.
11. See FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(4) (2008) (stating that the full information about scientific
tests that a defendant is entitled to request does not include “manuals, schematics, or software of
the instrument used to test the person or any other material that is not in the actual possession of
the state”); see also Moe v. State, 944 So. 2d 1096, 1097 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (holding that the
source code of the Intoxilyzer 5000 was a protected trade secret not in the State’s possession, and
thus the State had no obligation to disclose it).
12. See State v. Muldowny, 871 So. 2d 911, 913 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (“It seems to us that
one should not have privileges and freedom jeopardized by the results of a mystical machine that
is immune from discovery, that inhales breath samples and that produces a report specifying a
degree of intoxication.”).
13. See infra notes 165–70 and accompanying text.
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This Note explores the issue of source code discovery by DUI
defendants. Part II of this Note examines the case law and statutes used to
shield breath testing machines from scrutiny. It examines both the
approach taken by Florida and the approaches adopted in other states. Part
II also discusses the application of trade secrets protection to the source
code of breath testing machines. Part III further examines the problem of
source code discovery through the lens of the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Finally, Part IV
concludes by posing a solution to the problem that more properly balances
the important rights of the accused with the trade secrets concerns of the
breath testing machine’s manufacturer. Florida should allow a DUI
defendant to review the computer source code of a breath test machine if
impairment is at issue in the case. Barring that, the state should negotiate
for source code access to allow defendants to verify the machine’s
accuracy.
II. SOURCE CODE DISCOVERY
Breath testing machines are no more infallible than any other machine.
“Source code litigants have identified a litany of potential errors that can
be uncovered by a forensic expert’s examination of the [breath testing
machine] software.”14 Defendants may wish to show that the machine has
been modified from the version approved by the state, that software
changes have made the machine unreliable and inaccurate, or that there are
flaws in the way the machine calculates one’s breath alcohol level.15 To
effectively mount such a defense, counsel needs technical information
about the machine. Discovery of the machine’s source code,16 which
defines how the machine calculates results, proves particularly important
in mounting a technical challenge.
Consider, for instance, the example posed by defense attorneys Stuart
Hyman and Joerg Jaeger.17 Given that “the longer an individual blows into
14. Strutin, supra note 6, at 5.
15. As defense attorney Stuart Hyman put it, “we have guilt by machine in Florida. And if
you don’t examine the machine to determine whether it’s working properly, then people can go to
jail and lose their jobs.” Channel 9 News (ABC Orlando 9 WFTV-FL television broadcast Nov. 17,
2006).
16. Source code is the version of computer software as it is originally written in human
readable alphanumeric characters. See Linfo, Source Code Definition, The Linux Information
Project, http://www.linfo.org/source_code.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2008). In contrast, object code
is machine language consisting of a sequence of instructions, usually presented as a series of ‘1s’
and ‘0s’ that a computer processor can understand, but would be extremely difficult for a human
to read or modify. Id. As a result, “[l]ogic and reason dictate that it is more difficult to obtain trade
secrets from object code.” 2 MELVIN F. JAGER TRADE SECRETS LAW § 9:11 (2002).
17. See Stuart Hyman & Joerg Jaeger, How to Attack the Intoxilyzer® 8000: A Dissertation
on the Multitude of Problems that Have Arisen with this “New and Improved” Breath Testing

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 5

180

FLO RID A LAW REVIEW

[V ol. 61

the breath testing machine the higher the breath test results can be[,]”18
defense counsel may seek source code discovery to determine at exactly
which point the Intoxilyzer 8000 measures the breath alcohol content of
an individual blowing into it.19 This determination may be especially
important because variations in the length of time that an individual blows
are affected by physiological variables such as sex, physical condition, and
lung capacity.20
Another issue arises as to whether software changes in a breath testing
machine render the instrument unapproved. Florida law requires that a
person submit to an “approved” alcohol test21 “if the person is lawfully
arrested for any DUI offense.”22 Failure to submit to an approved test
results in a driver’s license suspension of one year for a first refusal, or
eighteen months for a subsequent refusal.23 Florida law vests the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) with the sole authority to
“approve or disapprove breath test instruments.”24 A modification made to
an approved breath testing machine may require reapproval or
recertification.25 Defense counsel may point out that when the FDLE
approved the Intoxilyzer 8000 for use in Florida on May 29, 2002, the
software version was 8100.10. 26 As of this writing, the software versions
in use in Florida are 8100.26 and 8100.27.27 The failure to reapprove the
Intoxilyzer 8000 after these software updates seems particularly troubling
given that changes in the analytical software of the machine require its
recalibration.28 Can such a machine still be called an approved alcohol
test? Such concerns underscore the need to obtain source code discovery
in order to critically analyze the testing instrument.

Method (Sept. 27–28, 2007) (outline on file with the Florida Law Review).
18. Id. at 13.
19. Id. at 15.
20. Id.
21. FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(1)(a)1.a. (2008) (emphasis added).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. § 316.1932(1)(a)2.
25. State v. Polak, 598 So. 2d 150, 153–54 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (holding that the bypass of
a sensor in an Intoximeter 3000 by the police department was a substantial modification of the
device requiring recertification or reapproval); see also State v. Flood, 523 So. 2d 1180, 1181 (Fla.
5th DCA 1988) (concluding that “modification of a component part of a previously certified breathtesting instrument requires re-certification of that instrument”).
26. See Hyman & Jaeger, supra note 17, at 4–5.
27. Id. at 5.
28. See Letter from Toby S. Hall, Applications Engineering Manager, CMI, Inc. to Laura
Barfield, Program Manager, Alcohol Testing Program, Florida Department of Law Enforcement
(Dec. 9, 2005), available at http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/atp/I-8000CMICorrespMisc/CMI
Correspondence.pdf.
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A. Florida’s Approach to Source Code Discovery in
DUI Prosecutions
Initially, Florida courts proved receptive to attempts to discover the
technical aspects of the Intoxilyzer. In State v. Muldowny,29 the Fifth
District Court of Appeal held that the defendants were entitled to inspect
and use at trial the operator’s manuals for the Intoxilyzer 5000, its
maintenance manuals, and its schematics.30 The defendants moved for the
State to produce such technical material, seeking to “determine whether
the [I]ntoxilyzer actually used to establish their driving impairment had
been substantially modified by the inclusion of parts that were not on the
schematics.”31 When the State refused, the county court suppressed the
results of defendants’ breath tests and certified the question to the court of
appeals.32
In holding that the defendant was entitled to obtain discovery about the
technical aspects of the Intoxilyzer 5000, the court relied primarily on
Florida Statute § 316.1932(1)(f)(4),33 which provided, at that time, “full
information concerning the test taken at the direction of the law
enforcement officer shall be made available to the person or his or her
attorney.”34 The court concluded that operating manuals, maintenance
manuals, and schematics were necessarily part of the full information to
which a defendant is entitled.35 As a result of the State’s refusal to comply
with the discovery order, the court affirmed the suppression of the breath
test results.36
This pro-defendant trend did not last. In Moe v. State,37 the same court
decided that Muldowny did not require the State to produce the source
code of the Intoxilyzer 5000.38 Here, similar to the defendants in
Muldowny, the defendant sought production of the source code to
determine whether the machine had been modified from the approved
version.39 The county court declined to enter an order compelling the State
to produce the code.40 The Fifth District Court of Appeal noted that

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

871 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).
Id. at 913.
Id.
Id. at 912.
Id. at 913 (citing FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(1)(f)(4) (2002)).
FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(1)(f)(4) (2002).
Muldowny, 871 So. 2d at 913.
Id. at 914.
944 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).
Id. at 1097.
Id.
Id.
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Muldowny had not reached the question of whether the State had an
obligation to produce the source code of the Intoxilyzer 5000.41 Rather, it
narrowly construed Muldowny as holding “that the lower court did not
abuse its discretion when it imposed sanctions because the State had
disobeyed a discovery order requiring that it produce the operator’s
manual, maintenance manual and schematic for the Intoxilyzer 5000.”42
In Moe, it was apparently without dispute that the State did not possess
the Intoxilyzer 5000 source code,43 because it was the property of the
machine’s manufacturer and was a protected trade secret.44 The court
further noted that because manufacturer CMI, Inc. had invoked statutory
and common-law trade secrets protections, the State could not obtain the
technical information sought.45 Nothing in the statutory language requiring
full disclosure “manifests a legislative intent that the State must furnish
information that cannot be obtained by it.”46
However, one can also read Moe in a narrower sense. The court seemed
to limit its holding, noting that “[u]nder the facts of this case” the State
could not be required to produce the source code of the Intoxilyzer 5000.47
The court also noted, “[n]o challenge has been advanced pertaining to the
accuracy and reliability of Appellant’s particular test results.”48 This
suggests that a defendant should assert a particularized challenge to his
results in order to increase his chances for obtaining source code
discovery.49
While Moe was being litigated, the Florida Legislature even more
clearly limited a defendant’s ability to discover technical information
relating to breath testing machines.50 Florida Statute § 316.1932 provides
that defendants are still entitled to “full information” concerning their test
results.51 In a feat of verbal gymnastics, the legislature defined “full
information” as the type of test administered and procedures followed, the
time the sample was analyzed, the type and status of any permit issued to
the person who performed the test, and, in the case of a breath test, the date

41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Nor does the state possess the source code for the Intoxilyzer 8000. See infra notes
165–71 and accompanying text.
44. Moe, 944 So. 2d at 1097.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1096.
48. Id. at 1097.
49. As did the defendant in In re Commissioner of Public Safety, 735 N.W.2d 706, 710
(Minn. 2007).
50. The court’s opinion noted, “[t]he statute was subsequently amended to limit the
disclosure requirement to enumerated items.” Moe, 944 So. 2d at 1097 n.2.
51. FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(1)(f)(4) (2008).
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of the machine’s most recent inspection.52 “Full information” does not
include, however, “manuals, schematics, or software of the instrument
used to test the person or any other material that is not in the actual
possession of the state.”53 In addition, “full information does not include
information in the possession of the manufacturer of the test instrument.”54
Thus, the legislature rejected the holding of Muldowny and codified the
court’s ruling in Moe.55
Lower courts in Florida have shown more sympathy for the defendant
seeking to obtain discovery about the technical details of the Intoxilyzer.
At least one judge in Orange County has ordered the State to provide the
defendant with discs containing the Intoxilyzer 8100.26 and 8100.27
software.56 County judges in Sarasota and Manatee counties57 have ordered
the release of the source code to defense counsel.58 When the manufacturer
CMI, Inc. refused, the judges imposed fines for non-compliance, which
now total more than $100,000.59 These financial disincentives have
prompted CMI to agree to limited disclosure of the source code and CMI
stated that it will agree to a “controlled viewing,” with a protective order
and non-disclosure agreement, when ordered by the court.60 Of course,
CMI maintains that “[a]ll rights in software, including both source code
and object code, used in association with the INTOXILYZER® brand of
breath alcohol instruments are considered confidential, proprietary or a
trade secret.”61
It remains unclear exactly what such a controlled viewing would
entail,62 and, as a result, these conditions will likely not satisfy defense
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. One Florida court also held that the uniform law to secure the attendance of witnesses
from within or without a state in criminal proceedings cannot be used to compel production of the
Intoxilyzer source code because such information is not “material” as required for the application
of the uniform law. See State v. Bastos, 985 So. 2d 37, 42 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (citing FLA. STAT.
§ 942.03).
56. See Hyman & Jaeger, supra note 17, at 12 (citing State v. Bledsoe, Case No. 48-2006CT-16980-0 (Fla. 9th Jud. Cir. June 13, 2007)).
57. Interestingly, these counties are not part of Florida’s Fifth Circuit, which ruled in Moe.
See Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.5dca.org/faq.shtml (last visited Oct. 9, 2008).
58. See Todd Ruger, Fines Rise in DUI Software Fight, SARASOTA HERALD TRIB., Mar. 9,
2007, at BCE1.
59. Id.
60. See Letter from Toby Hall, President of CMI, Inc., to clients (Sept. 25, 2007), available
at http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/atp/I-8000CMICorrespMisc/CMI Correspondence.pdf.
61. CMI, Inc., Statement of Corporate Policy Concerning Intellectual Property Associated
with I N T OX ILY ZE R ® Brand of Breath Alcohol Instruments, available at
http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/atp/I-8000CMICorrespMisc/CMI Correspondence.pdf.
62. In a letter to clients, CMI, Inc. President Toby Hall stated:
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counsels. For such a controlled viewing to be useful to the defense,
counsel must also have the opportunity to show the source code to an
expert. Additionally, the term “controlled viewing” seems to imply that
CMI would not allow counsel to possess a copy of the source code, but
only to look at it.
This position departs from the previous position CMI articulated. In
State v. Burnell,63 CMI resisted source code requests by the defense,
stating it was “obviously not required to provide . . . discovery in any case
in which it is neither a party nor a witness nor, for that matter, a
resident.”64 CMI said it would “vigorously dispute” any order to disclose
technical information about the Intoxilyzer 5000, citing “any number of
reasons, including trade secrets.”65 To be sure, an offer of a controlled
viewing represents a substantial improvement from CMI’s prior position,
but with so much of CMI’s voluntary “controlled viewing” scheme
undefined, it remains an insufficient solution.
Apart from the reluctance of CMI to disclose source code, software
problems that plague the Intoxilyzer 5000 also underscore the importance
of allowing defense counsel to obtain discovery of technical details to
challenge the machine’s reliability and accuracy. The first glitch of the
Intoxilyzer 8000 was discovered soon after the machine was introduced in
Florida in 2002.66 State officials did not discover the error. Rather, defense
counsels noticed the glitch in the way the machine measured alcohol.67 The
Intoxilyzer 8000 erroneously registered many test results as valid when,
in fact, they should have been rejected because the individual being tested
did not blow sufficient air into the machine.68 Laura Barfield, program
manager for the FDLE’s Alcohol Testing Program, acknowledged, “there
are missing instructions in the Intoxilyzer 8000 software version 8100.26
dealing with the instrument’s ability to correctly identify certain breath

Over the coming weeks, I intend to provide a means for the review of our most
valued intellectual property in a way that will protect our property and interests
and provide relief to you, our highly valued customers. As more information
becomes available regarding this matter, I will be back in touch.
Letter from Toby Hall, President of CMI, Inc., to clients, supra note 60. As of March 8, 2008, no
further relevant correspondence from CMI has been posted on the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement’s Alcohol Testing Program’s Public Records website.
63. No. MV06479034S, 2007 WL 241230 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 2007).
64. Id. at *3.
65. Id.
66. Todd Ruger, Judge Tells Breath-Test Maker to Release Code, SARASOTA HERALD TRIB.,
Aug. 15, 2007, at B1.
67. See Breath Test Devices Backed, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, June 15, 2007, at B3.
68. Judges Gather to Assess DUI Machine Accuracy, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 28, 2007,
at B1.
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samples that do not meet a minimum volume of 1.1 Liters.”69 To properly
calculate a reliable breath test result, the Intoxilyzer 8000 requires
“minimum time, slope, flow, and volume components.”70 “Only when
those minimally acceptable requirements are met, will the breath sample
be scientifically reliable and the quantitative result accurately reflect[] the
alcohol concentration circulating in a person’s body.”71 Without obtaining
a sample of sufficient volume, the Intoxilyzer 8000 also cannot determine
whether interferents or mouth alcohol are present.72 That volume-related
glitch resulted in the dismissal of 224 DUI prosecutions statewide.73 State
officials later updated the flawed machines.74 Other mysterious glitches
have been noted as well.75
B. Source Code Discovery in Other States
In other states, source code of similar breath testing machines also
suggests that such devices may be seriously flawed.76 Recently, defense
counsel in New Jersey obtained a ruling granting discovery of the source
code used in that state’s breath testing machine, the Draeger Alcotest
7110.77 In that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court appointed a Special
Master who ordered that the source code of the Alcotest 7110 be disclosed
to an independent software house hired by the defendants.78 The
subsequent analysis of the source code of that device revealed that
catastrophic error detection is disabled, meaning that the Alcotest 7110
could appear to run correctly while actually executing invalid code.79 The
machine measures the air flow at start-up and uses this number as a
baseline for future calculations.80 However, this baseline value is not

69. Hyman & Jaeger, supra note 17, app. A at 5 (reprinting the county court’s order in State
v. Bledsoe, No. 48-2006-CT-16980-0 (Fla. 9th Jud. Cir. June 13, 2007)).
70. Letter from Guy Tunnell, Commissioner, FDLE, to Bruce H. Colton, President, Florida
Prosecuting Attorneys Association (Aug. 11, 2005), available at http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/atp/I8000FDLECorresp/FDLEI-8000Corres.pdf.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See Judges Gather to Assess DUI Machine Accuracy, supra note 68.
74. Ruger, supra note 66.
75. See, e.g., Hyman & Jaeger, supra note 17, at 9.
76. The problems of other breath testing machines, of course, do not necessarily relate to the
Intoxilyzer. Yet, in the absence of discovery of the Intoxilyzer source code, such problems provide
a glimpse of what may be under the proverbial hood.
77. DUI Blog, http://www.duiblog.com/2007/09/04/secret-breathalyzer-software-finallyrevealed/ (Sept. 4, 2007, 08:36 EST).
78. State v. Chun, 923 A.2d 226, 226–27 (N.J. 2007).
79. DUI Blog, supra note 77.
80. Id.
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checked for quality or reasonableness,81 which casts doubt on the validity
of results. Furthermore, though the machine detects measurement errors,
it ignores the errors unless they occur a consecutive number of times.82
Ultimately, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the Alcotest
7110 was generally scientifically reliable, though “certain modifications
are required in order to permit its results to be admissible or to allow it to
be utilized to prove a per se violation of the [DUI] statute.”83
Despite such reasons to believe that breath testing machines may be
highly flawed, other states have kept technical information pertaining to
breath testing machines from the defendant. Connecticut, for example,
echoes Florida’s approach in Moe. In State v. Burnell,84 a Connecticut
Superior Court in New Haven held that the defendant was not entitled to
inspect or use at trial the technical manuals, schematics, computer source
code, and computer program of the Intoxilyzer 5000.85 The court reasoned,
as did the Florida court in Moe, that the State did not possess the requested
items and thus had no affirmative duty to produce them.86
Georgia has also adopted an approach similar to Moe. In Cottrell v.
State,87 the defendant argued that the “full information” to which he was
entitled included technical information such as the Intoxilyzer’s source
code.88 The court ruled that “full information” included “‘memos, notes,
graphs, computer printouts, and other data relied upon by a state crime lab
chemist in obtaining gas chromatography test results.’”89 It did not include
the information the defendant requested, at least where defendant did not
show that the information was relevant.90 The court failed to address the
question of whether the source code would have been discoverable had the
defendant demonstrated its relevance. The question of the factual showing
required to demonstrate the relevance of source code also remains
unanswered. Would it be enough for the defendant to say “it’s relevant,”
or would a defendant have to show that there may be software flaws in a
given machine?

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 120 (N.J. 2008).
84. No. MV06479034S, 2007 WL 241230 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 2007).
85. Id. at *2.
86. Id.; see also State v. Walters, No. DBDMV050340997S, 2006 WL 785393, at *1 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 2006) (holding that the source code for the Intoxilyzer 5000 was not within the
State’s possession and thus disclosure was not required).
87. 651 S.E.2d 444 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
88. Id. at 445 & n.1.
89. Id. at 446 (quoting Townsend v. State, 511 S.E.2d 587, 590 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)).
90. Id.
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A New York court also held that the defendant had no right to
discovery of the source code of the breath testing machine.91 The New
York City Criminal Court held that “the People do not actually or
constructively possess the source code.”92 New York’s approach in
Cialino, however, does differ somewhat from the anti-defendant approach
to source code discovery seen elsewhere. The court noted that the
Intoxilyzer 5000 was a reliable machine and characterized defendant’s
attempts to discover the source code as a “fishing expedition.”93 Yet the
court seemed to leave the door open to a possible discovery by the defense,
holding that “[i]t is incumbent on the defendant to show that a software
change has altered the reliability and accuracy of the machine.”94 The court
said the defendant had not provided a “reasonable basis” to believe that
changes to the software of the Intoxilyzer 5000 had caused it to become
unreliable.95
This holding suggests that if a defendant could provide New York
courts a “reasonable basis” to believe that changes to the software of the
Intoxilyzer 5000 had caused it to become unreliable, then perhaps the
defendant would be entitled to discover such technical details. At the same
time, though, this ruling presents a “Catch-22.” How will a defendant ever
be able to show that technical changes to an Intoxilyzer caused it to
become unreliable if a defendant can never access the technical details of
the Intoxilyzer?96
Minnesota has been the friendliest in response to attempts by the
defense to obtain discovery of breath testing machine source code. In In
re Commissioner of Public Safety,97 the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that a DUI defendant was entitled to the “‘complete computer source
code’” of the Intoxilyzer 5000EN.98 The procedural posture of the case,
however, suggests that this holding should not be construed too broadly.99
91. See People v. Cialino, 831 N.Y.S.2d 680, 681 (Crim. Ct. 2007).
92. Id. In contrast, the Georgia court in Cottrell did not discuss the potential constructive
possession issue. 651 S.E.2d 444 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). Similarly, the Connecticut court in Burnell
did not address the issue of constructive possession, noting simply, “The state is not in possession
of the items sought by the defense.” No. MV06479034S, 2007 WL 241230, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Jan. 18, 2007).
93. Id. at 681–82.
94. Id. at 682.
95. Id.
96. For an example of this “Catch-22” at work in Florida, see State v. Bastos, 985 So. 2d 37,
41–42 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) which concluded that “[t]here would need to be a particularized
showing demonstrating that observed discrepancies in the operation of the machine necessitate
access to the source code.”
97. 735 N.W.2d 706 (Minn. 2007).
98. Id. at 708 (quoting and affirming the lower district court’s order).
99. In re Commissioner of Public Safety arose after a DUI defendant obtained a discovery
order requiring the Commissioner of Public Safety to provide him “with an operational
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This decision has resulted in further litigation: the state of Minnesota has
now sued CMI to force it to turn over the source code.100
The underlying facts of the case also drove the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s pro-defendant decision. Unlike Florida101 and New York,102
Minnesota was in constructive possession of the Intoxilyzer source code.103
The Court discussed that the express language of Minnesota’s contract
with manufacturer CMI, Inc. “requires CMI to provide the state with
‘information . . . to be used by attorneys representing individuals charged
with crimes in which a test with the [Intoxilyzer 5000EN] is part of the
evidence.’”104 Additionally, the Commissioner of Public Safety conceded
that “the state owns and thus controls some portion of the source code.”105
As a result, the State of Minnesota could not assert, as was essential for the
State of Florida in Moe, that it did not actually or constructively possess
the source code defendant sought.106 Because Minnesota had contractually
provided for source code access, a writ of prohibition could not be granted
because the State did have an adequate remedy at law.107 If CMI did not
turn over the source code as it was contractually obligated to do,
Minnesota “could sue CMI to force it to turn over the complete computer
source code.”108 The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the
Commissioner’s ability to enforce its contract with CMI constituted an
adequate legal remedy.109
Thus, despite possible problems with the Intoxilyzer110 and Alcotest
7110,111 courts have generally opposed attempts to discover source codes.

Intoxilyzer 5000EN instrument and ‘the complete computer source code for the operation of the
[Intoxilyzer 5000EN].’” 735 N.W. 2d 706, 708 (Minn. 2007). The Commissioner sought a writ of
prohibition to prevent the district court from enforcing the order. A court of appeals denied the
Commissioner’s request and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. In so ruling, the Minnesota
Supreme Court pointed out that “[a] writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy and is only used
in extraordinary cases.” Id. at 710. The Court stated that a writ of prohibition would only be issued
in four particular circumstances, none of which the Court found applicable in the instant case. Id.
100. Shannon Fiecke, Flip-Flopping Courts Leave DWI Test Debacle in Limbo, SHAKOPEE
VALLEY NEWS, Oct. 31, 2008, available at http://shakopeenews.com/news/general_news/flip_flop
ping_courts_leave_dwi_test_debacle_limbo-7497.
101. See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text (discussing Moe v. State).
102. See supra notes 91–95 and accompanying text (discussing People v. Cialino).
103. See Commissioner, 735 N.W.2d at 712–13.
104. Id. at 713 (omission and alteration in original).
105. Id. at 712–13.
106. See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text (discussing Moe v. State).
107. Commissioner, 735 N.W.2d at 713.
108. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. Id.
110. See supra notes 8–9, 66–73 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 77–82 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss1/5

12

Short: Guilt by Machine: The Problem of Source Code Discovery in Florida

2009]

TH E PRO BLEM O F SO U RC E C O D E D ISC O VERY IN FLO RID A D U I PRO SEC U TIO N S

189

Courts in Connecticut,112 Georgia,113 and New York114 have joined Florida
in rejecting attempts by defense counsel to obtain the source code of breath
testing devices. Though Minnesota permitted source code discovery in In
re Commissioner of Public Safety, that ruling is at least partly the result of
the unique facts and procedural posture of that case.115 While New Jersey
allowed examination of the Alcotest 7110’s source code, the machine was
ultimately found to be reliable, despite a number of flaws.116 Overall, the
outlook for DUI defendants seeking to obtain source code discovery is
bleak.
C. Trade Secrets and the Intoxilyzer
Breath test machine manufacturers may invoke the trade secrets
privilege to shield source code from discovery. The trade secrets privilege
operates to shield certain proprietary information from discovery in legal
proceedings. Trade secrets include information117 that derives independent
economic value from not being generally known to, or ascertainable by,
others who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use,118 and is
the subject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.119 Florida Statutes
provide that an individual who owns such information has the privilege of
disclosing it, and may prevent others from disclosing it.120
Courts are willing to protect source codes as trade secrets.121 As early
as 1973, courts recognized that source code could receive intellectual
property protections.122 A decade later, courts began recognizing source

112. See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 97–108 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 76–83 and accompanying text.
117. Such information includes formulas, patterns, compilations, programs, devices, methods,
techniques, or processes. FLA. STAT. § 688.002(4) (2008).
118. Id. § 688.002(4)(a).
119. Id. § 688.002(4)(b).
120. Id. § 90.506.
121. See, e.g., Rare Coin-It, Inc. v. I.J.E., Inc., 625 So. 2d 1277, 1279 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)
(holding that the source code of a Nintendo video game was a protected trade secret).
122. See Telex Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 325–26 (N.D. Okla. 1973),
rev’d on other grounds, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975) (holding that copyright protections applied
to computer source code despite the widespread distribution of the object code).
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code as a protected trade secret.123 In many cases, the form of computer
code dictates the level of protection it receives.124 Because source code is
written in programming language comprehensible to trained personnel, it
can be “altered or misappropriated by unauthorized personnel.”125 Thus,
it stands in contrast to machine-readable object code, which is “very
difficult, if not impossible” to comprehend visually.126
The source code of breath testing devices, however, may not even fit
the definition of a protected trade secret at all. Consider once more the
example of the Draeger Alcotest 7110.127 After the Supreme Court of New
Jersey ordered the manufacturer to produce the source code, defense
counsel had an independent software house analyze it.128 The resulting
examination of the code revealed that it consisted primarily of general
algorithms and, as a result, was arguably not unique or proprietary.129
If a breath testing machine’s source code is a patchwork of general
algorithms, it cannot be a trade secret. As Florida law requires, information
protected by the trade secrets privilege must not be generally known, or
readily ascertainable by others who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use.130 It is true that “the fact that several competitors each
independently use a process that each has independently discovered would
not necessarily mean this undisclosed information is no longer a trade
secret.”131 However, a finding that competitors independently used a
process might be relevant to the assertion that certain information is not
generally known.132 Further, if the algorithms used are generally known,
then they cannot truly be independently discovered and independently
used. Thus, courts should not allow manufacturers of generically-coded
breath testing machines to hide behind the shield of trade secrets.
Is the Intoxilyzer’s source code, like the Alcotest 7110’s code, full of
general algorithms? At this point, the public cannot know. Significantly,

123. See Q-Co Indus., Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“Computer
software, or programs, are clearly protectible under the rubric of trade secrets . . . .”); see also
Hyman & Jaeger, supra note 17, app. A, at 8 (reprinting the county court’s order in State v.
Bledsoe, No. 48-2006-CT-16980-0 (Fla. 9th Jud. Cir. June 13, 2007)) (noting expert testimony that
“one cannot interpret what a binary code says and reverse engineering is not commonly performed,
except perhaps within the intelligence community, because it is not accurate”).
124. See 2 JAGER, supra note 16.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See supra notes 77–82 and accompanying text.
128. DUI Blog, supra note 77.
129. Id.
130. FLA. STAT. § 688.002(4)(a) (2008).
131. Bestechnologies, Inc. v. Trident Envtl. Sys., Inc., 681 So. 2d 1175, 1176 (Fla. 2d DCA
1996).
132. Id.
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however, the machine’s manufacturer does not guarantee that its source
code is entirely original.133 After all, the license agreement for the
Intoxilyzer software provides that “CMI MAKES NO EXPRESS,
IMPLIED OR STATUTORY WARRANTY, THAT THE LICENSED
SOFTWARE OR ITS USE, SHALL BE FREE FROM INFRINGEMENT
OF PATENT, COPYRIGHT, OR OTHER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHT CLAIMS.”134 The silence, as they say, is deafening.
But even if one presumes that the Intoxilyzer source code is a protected
trade secret, the privilege may not bar defense counsel from obtaining
discovery of it. Several safeguards allow the court to order production of
a trade secret without imperiling the business interests of the producer. A
court cannot haphazardly order production; rather, it must first conduct an
in camera review.135 If after an in camera review,136 the court does
determine that the source code is a protected trade secret, it should then
“require the party seeking production to show reasonable necessity for the
requested materials.”137 In an order, the court can also enact a variety of
protective measures. Florida statutes provide that “a court shall preserve
the secrecy of an alleged trade secret by reasonable means,”138 including
in camera hearings, granting protective orders in connection with
discovery, sealing records, and ordering any person involved not to reveal
the trade secret without prior court approval.139 A court willing to use these
measures can more than adequately protect the manufacturer’s interests in
ensuring their trade secrets remain secret. There is no reason grounded in
the trade secrets doctrine to presumptively bar a defendant’s request for
discovery of the source code—other than, of course, a legislative motive
to appear “tough on drunk drivers.”
Furthermore, Florida law provides that the aegis of the trade secrets
privilege is available only if its allowance will not conceal fraud or
otherwise work injustice.140 In each case in which an individual asserts the

133. See CMI, Inc., Standard Software License Agreement—Restricted, available at
http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/atp/I-8000OtherMaterials/Intox8000SoftwareLicAgreement.pdf (last
visited Nov. 11, 2008).
134. Id.
135. See Beck v. Dumas, 709 So. 2d 601, 603 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (holding that a lower court
abused its discretion when it compelled production of source code and other technical information
without first conducting an in camera review and holding an evidentiary hearing).
136. Sheridan Healthcorp, Inc. v. Total Health Choice, Inc., 770 So. 2d 221, 222 (Fla. 3d DCA
2000) (holding that it was error to order production without in camera review).
137. Id. Given the presumption of impairment that Florida law creates when one has a breath
alcohol level of 0.08 grams or more, this showing would seem to be relatively easy in the DUI
context.
138. FLA. STAT. § 688.006 (2008).
139. Id.
140. Id. § 90.506.
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trade secrets privilege, “the trial judge must weigh the importance of
protecting the claimant’s secret against the interest in facilitating the trial
and promoting a just end to the litigation.”141 This calculation would not,
of course, always fall in the defendant’s favor. Permitting source code
discovery best promotes a just end to litigation in cases where the breath
alcohol test stands as the primary evidence.
Consider a case in which a defendant refuses to perform field sobriety
tests (or performs decently well) yet fails a breath test by a small margin.
In such an instance, the test result essentially stands in the shoes of a
witness, and therefore ensuring its reliability and accuracy is paramount
in reaching a just end. In contrast, the release of source code is probably
not necessary to promoting a just end to litigation when a defendant failed
this breath test by a spectacular margin, admitted to drinking heavily, or
where an officer’s dashboard camera clearly recorded evidence of
intoxication.
In the case of a criminal prosecution, achieving a just end is vitally
important. An individual convicted of DUI faces multiple penalties that an
ordinary misdemeanant would not. In Florida, for example, an individual
convicted of DUI faces a possible prison sentence of six months,142 a fine,
and the suspension of his or her driver’s license.143 The severity of
punishment also increases depending on whether an individual has prior
DUI convictions.144 A third conviction for DUI within a ten-year period is
a felony.145 A fourth DUI conviction is always a felony, regardless of when
the offenses occurred in relation to each other.146 Furthermore, intoxication
is an element of far more serious crimes such as DUI manslaughter,147 and
concerns about the reliability and accuracy of breath test results apply to
those offenses as well.
In addition to the multitude of criminal penalties faced by a defendant
convicted of DUI, many collateral penalties exist. For example, a drunk
driver’s license will be suspended.148 Drunk drivers face scorn because the
social stigma associated with drunk driving is tremendous.149 Finding

141. See CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, FLA. PRACTICE SERIES—EVIDENCE § 506.1 (West 2008)
(emphasis added).
142. Assuming that the DUI in question is the defendant’s first. See FLA. STAT.
§ 316.193(2)(a)(2).
143. Id. § 322.28.
144. See id. § 316.193.
145. Id. § 316.193(2)(b)(1).
146. Id. § 316.193(2)(b)(3).
147. See id. § 316.193(3)(c)(3).
148. Id. § 322.2615.
149. Shaming punishments mandated by the courts have also been upheld. See, e.g., Lindsay
v. State, 606 So. 2d 652, 653, 657 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (upholding a probation condition requiring
defendant to place and pay for a newspaper ad consisting of defendant’s name, mug shot, and the
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employment is substantially more difficult, given that many potential
employers require applicants to divulge whether they have ever been
arrested or convicted of any crimes.150 A criminal record may impact other
economic opportunities.151 A DUI conviction may also imperil a driver’s
professional license as well.152 Engineers and others in the defense
contracting field who require a Department of Defense Security Clearance
may also find their positions jeopardized.153
In contrast to the important liberty interests of a DUI defendant, the
interests of the breath testing machine’s manufacturer are relatively light.
A criminal defendant seeking source code discovery does not raise the
same alarm as a business competitor seeking equivalent discovery. The
fear that the defendant might use the source code to damage the
manufacturer’s business interests seems infinitesimal. Nor should a
manufacturer reasonably fear that opposing counsel will use the source
code to damage the manufacturer’s business. The lawyer already has a job,
and it does not deal with inventing breath testing machines. Lawyers are
also officers of the court and not likely to violate a court order governing
discovery of source codes by leaking the source code. Even if such an
unlikely scenario came to pass, the manufacturer already has an adequate
civil remedy: a cause of action in tort for the misappropriation of trade
secrets.154
Applying the trade secrets privilege to protect breath test machine
source code is also inappropriate because the policy objectives it serves are
not present in a criminal prosecution. The U.S. Supreme Court has noted,
for example, that the encouragement of invention and the cultivation of
commercial ethics are the policy considerations that underlie the trade
secrets privilege.155 Other courts have noted that the existence of the trade
secrets privilege serves similar goals. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
for instance, noted the importance of the trade secrets privilege in

caption “DUI—Convicted”).
150. See James B. Jacobs, Mass Incarceration and the Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 387, 419 (2006).
151. See id. at 408–09.
152. Pilots, for example, may find their licenses in jeopardy. See Federal Aviation
Administration, Reportable DUI/DWI Administrative Actions or Convictions,
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ash/ash_programs/investigations/air
men_duidwi/duidwi_reporting/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2008).
153. The Department of Defense may revoke or deny security clearances as a result of a DUI
arrest or conviction. See, e.g., DOD Indus. Sec. Clearance Decision, In re Applicant for Security
Clearance, ISCR Case No. 07-01608 (Sept. 28, 2007), available at http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/doha/
industrial/07-01608.h1.pdf.
154. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
155. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974); see also Water Servs.
Inc. v. Tesco Chems., Inc., 410 F.2d 163, 171 (5th Cir. 1969).
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subsidizing the research and development efforts of large companies.156
Allowing a DUI defendant the opportunity to scrutinize a breath testing
machine’s source code to determine its reliability and accuracy in no way
hampers the interests of spurring development and promoting good
commercial behavior. Arguably, allowing the defendant to discuss the
source code promotes these interests. Knowing that their product may be
scrutinized carefully by defense counsel for fatal flaws provides
manufacturers incentive to create reliable source codes to drive their
devices. It would not be, after all, good “commercial ethics” to sell flawed
products to the government for use in law enforcement.157 Because the
trade secrets privilege serves interests not implicated in the context of DUI
prosecution, it is an inappropriate way of resolving manufacturer’s
concerns.
Commentators have criticized the invocation of the trade secrets
privilege in matters of the public sphere. David Levine, for example,
argues that while trade secrets serve important policy objectives in the
private sector, “their use in the public infrastructure context is
inappropriate, unexpectedly powerful, and doctrinally unsound. When
private firms provide public infrastructure, commercial trade secrecy
should be discarded (at least in its pure form) and give way to more
transparency and accountability.”158 Trade secrets law, developed with the
commercial context in mind, seems particularly inappropriate in the public
sphere, especially given its “democratic values of transparency and
accountability.”159
Levine explored the tension between trade secrecy and the values of an
open, democratic society through the example of Diebold Election
Systems, Inc.160 Diebold refused to comply with a North Carolina law
mandating that a vendor of electronic voting machines place the software
of such machines, including source code, with an independent escrow
company so that the state could use the software to support and test the
voting machines.161 Diebold sought a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the statute, asserting that
such information was protected by licensing agreements.162 Though the
State of North Carolina won the initial case, “the power of trade secrecy
156. See Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 434–35 (Pa. 1960).
157. Application of trade secrets law sometimes creates incentives for other bad or inefficient
commercial behavior. See, e.g., David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in
Our Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 174 (2007).
158. Id. at 140.
159. Id. at 158.
160. Id. at 180–83.
161. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-165.9A(a)(1) (2008); Levine, supra note 157, at 180.
162. Levine notes that Diebold has compared this information to trade secrets in other
contexts. Levine, supra note 157, at 180–81 & n.206.
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principles presumably remained, because protection of secrets was not
overruled or overridden by the concerns of the public as manifested by the
laws of the state. Thus, Diebold could focus on states where trade secrecy
law is completely impermeable to public-law overrides.”163 One lesson of
the incident, Levine notes, is that “the notion that a government-controlled
or designated entity could adequately protect the interests of the general
public is dubious.”164
It is no great leap from voting machines to breath testing machines.
Surely, the activities of law enforcement constitute part of the public
sphere. So, too, does the invocation of trade secrets privileges stand at
odds with the value of an open society. Without knowledge of the source
code, the public simply has no way of knowing whether a breath testing
machine functions properly.
Florida, however, has made no effort to obtain the source code itself so
that it can ensure the reliability of the Intoxilyzer’s source code.165 Indeed,
when the state had the opportunity to write some form of source code
access into its contract with the manufacturer CMI, Inc., it declined to do
so.166 In negotiating the purchase of Intoxilyzer 8000 units, the FDLE “had
the chance to renegotiate its deal with CMI and require the company to
give up the source code[,]”167 as at least one other state did.168 At that time,
the FDLE official in charge of the FDLE’s Alcohol Testing Program stated
that the machines were reliable and that she did not need the source code
to demonstrate the machine’s reliability.169 This assertion came despite the
fact that defense attorneys had already been clamoring for discovery of the
Intoxilyzer 5000’s source code.170
As a result the State can conveniently assert that it neither actually nor
constructively possesses the source code.171 Further, Florida has enacted
a statutory barrier to source code discovery.172 The decision by Florida to
163. Id. at 181–82.
164. Id. at 183.
165. See Rene Stutzman, Breath-Test Glitch Sets Free 700 DUI Suspects: Source Codes of
Machine Not Available, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 11, 2005, at B6.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. As part of its contract with Minnesota, manufacturer CMI “must provide ‘information’
to be used by ‘attorneys representing individuals charged with crimes in which a test with the
proposed instrument is part of the evidence.’” Declan McCullagh, Police Blotter: Defendant Wins
Breathalyzer Source Code, CNET News.com, Aug. 9, 2007, http://www.news.com/Police-BlotterDefendant-wins-breathalyzer-source-code/2100-7348_3-6201632.html?tag=nl.e777 (quoting
Minnesota’s bid proposal). The Minnesota Supreme court ruled that this included the source code.
Id.
169. See Stutzman, supra note 165.
170. See id.
171. See, e.g., Moe v. State, 944 So. 2d 1096, 1097 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).
172. See FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(1)(f)(4) (2008).
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avoid possession of the source code 173 may have “helped” the prosecution
by providing grounds on which to rebuff defense discovery requests, but
it also works a detriment to ensuring the efficacy of a law enforcement
device at work in the public sphere.
The trade secrets rationale articulated by cases such as Moe does not
justify withholding the source code from the defendant in a DUI
prosecution. If the source code of a breath testing machine consists largely
of general algorithms, then it may not fit the statutory requirement that a
trade secret not be “generally known to, and not be[] readily ascertainable
by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from
its disclosure or use.”174 Additionally, the manifold protective measures
that can accompany an order to disclose already provide adequate
protections for the manufacturer’s interests. Few means would work
injustice as much as allowing a defendant in a criminal case to be
convicted largely on the basis of a potentially inaccurate machine.
III. A CONFRONTATION ISSUE
It is unjust to convict a defendant largely on the breath test result issued
by a machine whose technical details are undiscoverable. A discussion of
the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution175 makes clear the
constitutional problem of undisclosed source code.
The Confrontation Clause provides that a defendant has the right to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.176 Similarly, the Florida
Constitution states that the accused has the right to confront adverse
witnesses.177 In Crawford v. Washington,178 the Supreme Court held that
for testimonial evidence to be admitted when an adverse witness was
unavailable, the defendant must have had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the witness.179 The Court restricted its holding to “testimonial”
evidence, but declined to offer an exact definition of testimonial.180
However, it noted that the Confrontation Clause applied to more than just
in-court testimony.181 The Court also specifically listed some evidence that
the category of “testimonial evidence” would definitely encompass, such

173. See supra notes 37–46 and accompanying text (discussing Moe v. State).
174. FLA. STAT. § 688.002(4)(a).
175. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”).
176. Id.
177. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 16.
178. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
179. Id. at 53–54.
180. See id. at 51–52.
181. Id. at 53.
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as “affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant
was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements” that the
declarant would expect to be used in prosecutions.182
In its pre-Crawford cases, the Court stated that ensuring reliability was
the primary concern of the Confrontation Clause.183 In Ohio v. Roberts,184
the Court phrased the Confrontation Clause’s underlying concern as
augmenting accuracy in the fact-finding process by ensuring that the
defendant can effectively test adverse evidence.185 In Crawford, the
Supreme Court moved away from these rationales of reliability and
accuracy. The Court noted “the Confrontation Clause was directed [at] the
civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte
examinations as evidence against the accused.”186
Even post-Crawford, Florida courts still interpret the Confrontation
Clause as addressing the issue of reliability. In Shiver v. State,187 the court
stated “[t]he ultimate goal of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure
reliability of evidence. This is a ‘procedural rather than a substantive
guarantee’ and ‘commands . . . that reliability be assessed in a particular
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.’”188
An examination of the role of source code in DUI prosecutions
suggests that the codes fit within the Crawford definition of testimonial
evidence. Breath test results are admitted as evidence to prove a
defendant’s guilt; they are gathered solely for the purpose of prosecution.
Moreover, given the presumption of impairment created by a breath
alcohol level of 0.08 grams or more,189 such results are per se evidence of
guilt, and powerfully persuasive to a jury. Thus, the use of breath test
results implicates the same concerns that arise in Confrontation Clause
cases.
Consider a “close call” hypothetical: an anonymous tipster calls the
police to report a possible “drunk driver” swerving on the road and failing
to proceed in a single lane. An officer then pulls over the driver, who
refuses to answer questions about whether he has been drinking. The
driver also refuses to perform a field sobriety test. After being arrested, the
driver decides to cooperate (or perhaps to “press his luck”) by performing
a breath test. The machine indicates that the defendant’s breath alcohol
level is 0.08 grams. On this basis, the driver is charged with DUI.

182. Id. at 51.
183. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 (1987) (“[T]he right to confrontation
is a functional one for the purpose of promoting reliability in a criminal trial.”).
184. 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36.
185. Id. at 65.
186. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
187. 900 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).
188. Id. at 617 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61).
189. FLA. STAT. § 316.1934(2)(c) (2008).
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Without the breath alcohol evidence, the prosecution would have a
weak case against our hypothetical defendant. The swerving noticed by the
anonymous tipster, by itself, is not indicative of anything more than
careless, or perhaps reckless, driving. Even if the officer can testify to
observable signs of intoxication such as an odor of alcohol or bloodshot
eyes, the case remains weak without the breath test evidence. In such an
instance, the test result stands in the shoes of a witness, and provides the
most powerful evidence of guilt. Unlike a witness, whose reliability could
be challenged by defense counsel on cross-examination, the breath test
machine cannot be “confronted” by a defendant unless the defendant
understands how the machine actually works. While defense counsel might
be able to challenge results based on improper administration of the test,
or improper maintenance of the machine, there is simply no way of
knowing if the machine actually calculated its results properly without
access to the source code. Without the source code, a defendant cannot
truly scrutinize the evidence against him for reliability—an underlying
concern of the Confrontation Clause.
Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal has dealt with the
Confrontation Clause in the context of DUI prosecutions. In Belvin v.
State,190 the court discussed whether a breath test affidavit was testimonial
evidence under Crawford.191 Such breath test affidavits are used by the
State to show that a person trained to conduct the test administered it in an
approved manner on an approved machine that was tested and inspected.192
The Crawford court held that the breath test affidavit was testimonial
because it was admitted to prove the key element of the
crime—intoxication.193 Indeed, law enforcement generates breath test
affidavits for use at later criminal trials or at driver’s license revocation
proceedings.194 Because the breath test affidavit was testimonial evidence,
Crawford requires that the defendant have an opportunity to
cross-examine.195
In Pflieger v. State,196 the same Florida appellate court held that the
Confrontation Clause permitted introduction of the Intoxilyzer’s annual
reports because such evidence is not testimonial.197 The court compared
such annual reports to medical reports, stating “like the hospital record of
a blood test, [the Intoxilyzer annual report] is intended for the

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

922 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).
See id. at 1050–51.
Id. at 1048.
Id. at 1054.
Id. at 1050.
Id. at 1054.
952 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).
Id. at 1254.
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non-testimonial purpose of making sure the machine is working
properly.”198 The court suggested that it was important that the evidence
was merely a technical review of the Intoxilyzer199 undertaken in
accordance with administrative requirements.200 The evidence was not
offered “against any particular defendant.”201 The court stated that
“[d]ocuments establishing the existence or absence of some objective fact,
rather than detailing the criminal wrongdoing of the defendant, are not
‘testimonial’” such that they would implicate the Confrontation Clause.202
The source code of the Intoxilyzer is more like the breath test affidavit
that triggered the Confrontation Clause in Belvin rather than the annual
report in Pflieger, which did not. Just as the breath test affidavit spoke to
an element of the crime of DUI, so too does the source code. It provides
the definitive explanation of exactly how the Intoxilyzer calculates a
defendant’s breath alcohol level. The source code directs the breath test
machine’s processing of the defendant’s data and produces the crucial
number for breath alcohol level. Thus, the source code, unlike the annual
report, details the criminal wrongdoing of the defendant. It is, as Pflieger
proponed, offered against a particular defendant. The presumption of
intoxication created by Florida Statute § 316.1934(c) further dictates the
tremendous weight that breath test results, and the source code that drives
them, have on a defendant’s guilt.
A defendant cannot critically analyze and confront a breath test result
without knowing how the result was obtained. Central to this knowledge
is the source code. Trying to analyze a breath test result without the source
code from which it was obtained is like trying to analyze a football game
by looking at a final score, without watching any of the game. By simply
looking at a final score, one cannot evaluate the result. Did one team
dominate the game from the beginning? Did the referee “give the game
away” with a horrendous call? Did the winning team come from behind in
the game’s waning moments to cobble together a longshot win? Similarly,
without knowledge of the source code, a defendant is left with numerous
questions. Did his breath test follow from a legitimate process? Or was the
code heavily flawed and “buggy”? Did the breath test machine account for
all pertinent variables? Without knowledge of the breath test machine’s
source code, a defendant simply cannot know. Depriving a DUI defendant
of source code discovery makes him unable to effectively confront the
primary evidence against him: his breath test result.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 1253.
200. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11D-8.003 (2008).
201. Pflieger, 952 So. 2d at 1253 (citing Bosancurt v. Eisenberg, 129 P.3d 471, 477 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2006)).
202. Id. at 1254 (quoting Michels v. Commonwealth, 624 S.E.2d 675, 668 (Va. Ct. App.
2006)).
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IV. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSED SOLUTION
Florida’s approach to the question of discovery of the Intoxilyzer
source code is unacceptable. To date, the legislature and the courts have
failed to show concern about the flaws of breath testing machines,203
leaving the defendant no method by which he can truly evaluate whether
such a machine correctly calculates one’s breath alcohol level. While this
posture serves the politically motivated end of appearing tough on DUI,
it also ensures that no party can independently verify the reliability and
accuracy of the Intoxilyzer.
Courts should reject the trade secrets argument advanced by
manufacturers of breath testing machines. There are questions regarding
whether the source code of such devices should truly be considered
proprietary. Who can say whether such source codes are not generally
known to others, and thus even appropriate for trade secrets protection in
the first place? Even if breath testing machine source codes qualify as
trade secrets, there is no justification why the trade secret should not be
disclosed subject to a protective order. Courts have a plethora of tools that
they can use to curb potential abuses.204 The interests of breath test
manufacturers in ensuring that their source code remains hidden from
public view pale next to the interests of justice in ensuring a fair trial for
DUI defendants.
Florida’s statute excluding technical information from discovery
ignores potential Confrontation Clause issues.205 Even if breath test
machine source code cannot be considered testimonial evidence,
withholding it from the defendant raises constitutional concerns. Breath
test provides the most persuasive evidence of an element of DUI,
impairment; thus, the defendant should have an opportunity to “confront”
it and evaluate its reliability. In many cases, a breath test result stands in
the shoes of a witness. To adapt a phrase from Davis v. Washington,206 the
breath test machine is “acting as a witness.”207 Failing to allow
examination of its source code to determine accuracy of the result is
failing to allow cross-examination of a prosecution witness.
In light of these concerns, Florida should change course and adopt a
different approach. The legislature should amend Florida Statute
§ 316.1932(4) to allow a DUI defendant to obtain discovery of the
Intoxilyzer’s source code if impairment is at issue. Such an amended

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See supra notes 37–61 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 135–39 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.
547 U.S. 813 (2006).
Id. at 828.
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statute could provide for appropriate protective measures to accompany
the release of this information, including the threat of contempt.
Additionally, such a statute would eliminate potential judicial
inconsistency regarding disclosure.
Failing such a legislative course, the State of Florida should bargain,
as Minnesota did, for access to the source code of any breath testing
machine used in Florida. There is no legitimate reason why Florida could
not apply its substantial bargaining power to ensure that the manufacturer
supplying the state with breath testing machines also provides the source
code to DUI defendants in certain instances. With full knowledge of the
source code, the defendant would have the ability to adequately prepare a
defense addressing the Intoxilyzer’s reliability and accuracy, and the
uncertainty surrounding this mystical machine would disappear.
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